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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the government decides to assume a major role in providing and paying 
for healthcare, the government also has to decide exactly what constitutes 
appropriate, reasonable, or essential healthcare under its program. Congress, of 
course, recognized this necessity when it passed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), and the statute itself provides authority to the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to determine the “essential health benefits” 
that must be covered under the ACA beginning in 2014, both by insurers offering 
plans within governmentally sponsored exchanges and on the individual and small-
employer markets outside the exchanges.
1
 In a decision that was hailed as both 
“politically astute” and problematic for the goals that the ACA itself was supposed 
                                                           
† Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 
163-64 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
§§ 1302(b)(1), 2707(a) (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 18022(b)(1) (West 2012)). This Article refers 
to the consolidated act, with amendments, as the “ACA.” See also generally John K. Iglehart, 
Defining Essential Health Benefits—The View from the IOM Committee, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1461, 
1461-62 (2011) (describing the “essential health benefits” requirement imposed on insurance 
companies within and outside the exchanges). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070945
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to accomplish,
2
 HHS shunted off the task of defining the term “essential health 
benefits” to the individual states.
3
  
The states’ authority to choose a package of essential benefits for their citizens 
is not totally open-ended, of course. States will be required to specify a “benchmark 
plan” within parameters specified by HHS, to which other approved plans must be 
“substantially equal.”
4
 In addition, every package of essential benefits must 
encompass ten different categories of benefits that have been specified in the ACA 
itself, and nondiscrimination norms apply.
5
 Nonetheless, states end up with 
considerable discretion under what appears to be a political compromise. 
Needless to say, the crafters of this plan were aware of the intensely fraught 
nature of any attempt to define the essence of “health,” “healthcare,” or “medical 
necessity.”
6
 Such decisions affect the lives and choices of the individuals covered by 
regulated insurance plans, as well as the bottom line of the insurers themselves. The 
breadth and precise nature of the ACA’s requirements will directly affect the Act’s 
ability to meet its stated goals of providing comprehensive coverage for the vast 
majority of Americans and controlling healthcare costs.
7
 And in certain domains—
particularly reproductive healthcare—the decision to include or exclude a particular 
service may carry political consequences and implicate value choices in a way that is 
particularly salient. In August 2011, for example, substantial controversy 
accompanied HHS’s decision to adopt the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) 
recommendation that all new private health plans must, under the ACA, cover the 
full range of contraceptive options along with other preventive care for women.
8
 The 
debate became more heated when the Obama Administration announced its intention 
to maintain this requirement with only a very limited “conscience clause,” which 
exempts organizations that have religious objections to contraception but which is 
too narrow to cover some entities, such as hospitals and universities, that are 
operated by those religious groups.
9
 While some condemned the administration’s 
                                                           
2 See, e.g., INST. OF MED., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COSTS xi 
(2011) (describing the major goals of specifying essential health benefits as “balancing the 
comprehensiveness of benefits with their cost”); Sarah Kliff, What Counts as ‘Essential’ Health 
Care? White House Tells States to Decide, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2011, 2:51 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/what-counts-as-essential-health-care-white-
house-tells-states-to-decide/2011/12/16/gIQAzOAmyO_blog.html (describing some commentators’ 
concerns that comprehensiveness of coverage may be sacrificed in the interests of cutting costs). 
3 CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ESSENTIAL 
HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 8 (2011), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/ 
12162011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf. 
4 Id. at 8, 12. 
5 Id. at 10; see also ACA § 1302(b)(1). 
6 See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 2, at 8-5. 
7 Id. at xi. 
8 See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the ACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,626 (Aug. 3, 2011) (amendments to be codified at 
45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (announcing the interim final rule regarding coverage of preventive health 
services); Women’s Preventive Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, HEALTH 
RESEARCH & SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2012); 
Steven Ertelt, Pro-Life Groups, Catholic Bishops Blast Obamacare Recommendations, 
LIFENEWS.COM (July 19, 2011, 5:58 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2011/07/19/pro-life-groups-
catholic-bishops-blast-obamacare-recommendations/ (noting opposition to the pre-amended rule from 
groups such as Americans United for Life, the Family Research Council, and the Catholic bishops). 
9 Press Release, A Statement by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary 
Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html (last revised Feb. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Sibelius Statement] 
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decision as an assault on religious freedom, HHS cast its determination in terms of 
protecting women’s health.
10
 
This controversy highlights the extraordinarily hazy contours around the 
definition of health in a variety of legal and policy contexts and the significance of 
that definition for future debates surrounding the ACA. While acknowledging that 
numerous social, economic, and public health consequences may attach to the 
definition of medical necessity, this Article focuses primarily on the constitutional 
issues that may arise, depending on how broadly or narrowly the government defines 
concepts such as “medical necessity” and “essential health benefits.” At first glance 
it may appear that, beyond the debate about the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate, a governmental benefit program like the ACA is not likely to give rise to 
claims that an individual constitutional right has been violated. This Article 
speculates, however, that the unprecedented and expansive role of the government in 
directing individuals’ healthcare portended by the ACA may provoke a re-evaluation 
of some apparently settled constitutional principles. While acknowledging the wide 
scope of constitutional rights that may become implicated, this Article focuses on 
one right in particular—the so-called “negative right to health.” It argues that the 
negative right to health may be directly and substantively affected by governmental 
                                                                                                                                            
(announcing that HHS’s final rule will remain the same as the interim rule). The rule (in both its 
interim final form and final form) makes available an exemption from the contraceptives coverage 
requirement for employers who meet the following requirements: 
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization.  
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the 
organizations.  
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the 
organization.  
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in [those portions of the 
Internal Revenue Code pertaining to churches and their “integrated auxiliaries”]. 
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under 
the ACA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,626. Most, if not all, Catholic hospitals and Catholic colleges and 
universities would fail to meet all of these requirements. For example, most hospitals could not be 
considered to have the “inculcation of religious values” as their primary aim, and neither Catholic 
hospitals nor universities generally employ or serve primarily those who share their religious beliefs. 
As of the time of publication, the Obama Administration had announced its intent to further modify 
the rule so as to accommodate religious employers who would not meet the narrow requirements for 
exemption. According to a White House fact sheet, the new accommodation would ensure that 
“[r]eligious organizations will not have to provide contraceptive coverage or refer their employees to 
organizations that provide contraception,” and they would not be “required to subsidize the cost of 
contraception.” Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Women’s 
Preventive Services and Religious Institutions (Feb. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-s-preventive-services-and-
religious-institutions. Instead, coverage for contraceptives will be offered by the employers’ insurance 
companies directly, and without cost, requiring no involvement by those religious employers who 
oppose contraception. 
10 Compare Amanda Terkel, Newt Gingrich Condemns Obama Administration’s Contraception 
Rule, Calls It a ‘War Against Religion,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 2012, 12:10 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/30/newt-gingrich-obama-contraception-rule_n_1241655.html 
(noting the view of some conservatives that the contraception coverage rule constituted an assault on 
religion), with Sibelius Statement, supra note 9 (stating that the rule “will ensure that women with 
health insurance coverage will have access to the full range of the Institute of Medicine’s 
recommended preventive services” and noting that “[s]cientists have abundant evidence that birth 
control has significant health benefits for women and their families, is documented to significantly 
reduce health costs, and is the most commonly taken drug in America by young and middle-aged 
women”). 
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specification of essential health benefits, particularly if those benefits are defined in 
a way that excludes services that may be considered medically necessary. 
Part II of this Article provides background. That Part begins by describing the 
ways in which the Affordable Care Act, supplemented by the work of the IOM, 
defines concepts such as “medical,” “medical necessity,” and “essential health 
benefits.” Part II then provides a brief, non-exhaustive overview of the ways in 
which courts and commentators have struggled to define a related constellation of 
concepts surrounding health and healthcare in various other legal contexts. Part III 
then turns to the “negative right to health,” beginning with an explanation, in Part 
III.A, of what is meant by the “negative right to health” and arguing, succinctly, for 
its existence. Briefly, the negative right to health is a constitutional entitlement to 
protect one’s health by making medical treatment decisions without excessive 
government interference.
11
 As explained in greater depth below, this right may be 
inferred from case-law touching on reproductive rights, the right to refuse medical 
treatment, and related issues. The negative right to health has been described in great 
depth elsewhere;
12
 consequently, in this Article, both the description and the defense 
of the right are somewhat cursory. Part III.B then examines two significant 
limitations on possible arguments that the ACA infringes on the negative right to 
health: the state action doctrine and the subsidy/penalty distinction. Finally, Part 
III.C considers whether any constitutional claims pertaining to the definition of 
medical necessity under the ACA might survive under existing precedent. Even if no 
claim is likely to exist under current doctrine, this Article suggests that the eventual 
expansion of the government’s role in healthcare decision-making under the ACA 
may one day provoke a reconsideration of that precedent.  
II. THE DISPUTED NATURE OF “HEALTH” 
Political wrangling over the meaning of “health” recently took place in Ohio, 
when voters overwhelmingly passed an “anti-Obamacare” amendment to the state 
constitution.
13
 The ballot initiative, known as the Ohio Healthcare Freedom 
Amendment, sweepingly provided, with limited exceptions, that “[n]o federal, state, 
or local law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or 
health care provider to participate in a health care system,” nor “prohibit the 
purchase or sale of health care or health insurance,” nor “impose a penalty or fine for 
the sale or purchase of health care or health insurance.”
14
 By its terms, the 
amendment applied only to laws passed after March 19, 2010.
15
 Ironically, in light of 
the essentially conservative base of voters that supported the amendment, the first 
healthcare regulations to appear vulnerable were several abortion-related laws 
passed by the Ohio legislature in that same year, including a post-viability abortion 
ban, a ban on purchasing abortion insurance through the state-sponsored exchange to 
be created under the ACA, and a proposed ban on all abortions after the fetal 
                                                           
11 B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 
527 (2009) [hereinafter Hill, Reproductive Rights]. 
12 See, e.g., sources cited infra note 100. 
13 See, e.g., Aaron Marshall, State Issue 3 Won’t Have a Big Impact on Health Care in the Short 
Term, Experts Say, CLEVELAND.COM, (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/ 
2011/11/state_issue_3_wont_impact_new.html (noting that the amendment passed by a margin of two 
to one). 
14 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 21(A)-(C). 
15 Id. § 21(D). 
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heartbeat could be detected.
16
 Reproductive rights advocates in Ohio pointed out that 
such laws prohibited the purchase and sale of healthcare and were therefore 
vulnerable to constitutional challenge under the new amendment.
17
 Supporters of the 
Healthcare Freedom Amendment, hoping to keep in place the sorts of abortion 
restrictions that were recently passed in the state, responded that the Ohio legislature 
could avoid this conundrum simply by making it clear that abortion does not fall 
within the definition of “healthcare.”
18
 It is unclear, of course, whether the 
legislature will be able to change the impact of the Ohio Constitution by defining 
“healthcare” in a particular way through ordinary legislation; but this anecdote 
demonstrates, at a minimum, the absence of a clear definition of the term, as well as 
the essentially political nature of the determination of what is and is not healthcare. 
These two facets of the definition of “health” and “healthcare” are discussed at 
greater length below. 
A. MULTIPLE DEFINITIONS 
There are multiple, but related, concepts concerning “health,” all of which are 
relevant to the operation of the ACA, and there is no consistent or clear set of 
definitions for them. In each case, attempts to define concepts such as “medical 
necessity” and “essential health benefits” founder on circularity, or simply refer the 
matter to other entities to decide. As a general matter, “medical necessity,” a key 
term in insurance companies’ coverage decisions, usually refers to the medical 
appropriateness of a particular intervention in a particular case or type of case.
19
 
“Essential health benefits,” by contrast, is a term associated with the ACA and refers 
more broadly to the types of healthcare that must be covered under insurance plans, 
such as preventive office visits and “medically necessary” treatments for various 
types of conditions.
20
 Thus, “medical necessity” is a more case- or condition-specific 
concept, whereas “essential health benefits” refers more generally to the categories 
of coverage under a benefits plan. These terms are, of course, intimately related 
insofar as they address the question of what constitutes the sort of healthcare to 
which individuals can claim some form of statutory or contractual entitlement. At 
the same time, they remain vague at their core.
21
  
Numerous questions remain unanswered by the various attempts to define these 
terms. For example, how severe must the harm or pain be, before the need for 
medical treatment is recognized? Is the term “health” narrowly limited to physical 
                                                           
16 H.R. 78, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted); H.R. 125, 129th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (not yet enacted). 
17 Joe Guillen, Gov. John Kasich Signs 13 Bills into Law, Including Another Anti-Abortion 
Measure, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/ 
12/gov_kasich_signs_13_bills_into.html. 
18 Marshall, supra note 13. 
19 See, e.g., M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH: WHY DOCTORS ARE UNDER PRESSURE 
TO RATION CARE, PRACTICE POLITICS, AND COMPROMISE THEIR PROMISE TO HEAL 11 (2011) 
(describing “medical necessity” as “the legal standard for health insurance coverage in the United 
States and throughout much of the world”); INST. OF MED., supra note 2, at xii; cf. id. at 2-5 
(distinguishing “medical necessity” and “essential health benefits”). 
20 See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(a)-(b), 124 Stat. 119, 163-65 (2010) (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 18022(a)-(b)); see also INST. OF MED., supra note 2, at 4-2 to 4-3 (discussing the meaning 
of “essential”). 
21 See, e.g., BLOCHE, supra note 19, at 11 (characterizing the term “medical necessity” as “a 
malleable notion, more of a euphemism for physician habit than a scientific yardstick”). 
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health, or does it include mental health, emotional health, and social well-being? Is 
reproductive care an aspect of healthcare? And which persons or entities—doctors, 
patients, insurers, legislatures, regulators, or judges—are or should be empowered to 
make the final decision regarding medical necessity? Though an exhaustive study of 
the multiple contexts in which these issues arise is beyond the scope of this Article, 
Part II.A provides a sample of some of the ways in which courts and commentators 
have struggled with the various axes of defining “health,” “medical necessity,” and 
“essential health benefits.” 
1. The ACA and the Institute of Medicine Report 
Prolix though it is, the ACA itself contains very little in the way of explanation 
or definition of key concepts such as “medical,” “medical necessity,” and even 
“essential health benefits.” Section 1302 of the ACA lays out the ten categories of 
coverage that constitute the “essential health benefits” required for new health plans 
under the ACA.
22
 Beyond that, however, the ACA provides no more guidance and 
instead delegates to the Secretary of HHS the authority to define “essential health 
benefits.”
23
 The ACA contains no explicit definition of “medical necessity,” nor 
does it explicitly distinguish “medical” from “nonmedical” interventions.
24
 
The task of defining key concepts thus largely falls on HHS. Prior to the HHS 
decision to allow states to define essential health benefits on their own, the IOM 
issued (at the request of HHS) a lengthy consensus report entitled Essential Health 
Benefits: Balancing Coverage and Costs, in which it attempted to grapple with some 
of the complexities described above.
25
 The report noted, first, the difficulty of 
distinguishing “medical” from “nonmedical” interventions.
26
 After acknowledging 
that “the boundaries of what is medical and nonmedical are not always distinct,” and 
noting the additional difficulty that the ACA requires some coverage of 
“habilitation” services, which often have a social or educational component,
27
 the 
report simply recommended allowing the decision about the distinction between 
medical and non-medical to be made by individual health plans, “with oversight by 
state regulators and HHS.”
28
 
Similarly, the IOM report noted the multiple existing definitions of “medical 
necessity.” Again dispensing with the necessity of fixing one particular definition for 
the term, the IOM report embraced the view that “[t]he central question is whether 
the treatment is medical in nature and whether the individual can be expected to 
                                                           
22 ACA § 1302(b)(1); see also id. § 1301(a)(1)(b) (defining a “qualified health plan” as one that 
provides “essential health benefits”); id. § 2707 (requiring insurers on the small group and individual 
markets to provide “essential health benefits” as defined in the ACA). The ten required categories of 
coverage under the ACA are “[a]mbulatory patient services,” “[e]mergency services,” 
“[h]ospitalization,” “[m]aternity and newborn care,” “[m]ental health and substance use disorder 
services, including behavioral health treatment,” “[p]rescription drugs,” “[r]ehabilitative and 
habilitative services and devices,” “[l]aboratory services,” “[p]reventive and wellness services and 
chronic disease management,” and “[p]ediatric services, including oral and vision care.” Id. 
§ 1302(b)(1)(A)-(J). 
23 Id. § 1302(b)(1). 
24 The ACA does define “emergency medical condition” for various purposes, however. See, e.g., 
ACA §§ 2707(h)(1), 2719(b)(2)(A). 
25 INST. OF MED., supra note 2. 
26 Id. at 4-19 to 4-20. 
27 “Habilitation” is defined in the IOM report as “distinct from rehabilitation, in that it is 
designed to help a person first attain a particular function, versus restoring a function.” Id. at 4-4. 
28 Id. 
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF HEALTH? 451 
medically benefit from it”—thus referring back to the very term (“medical”) that it 
had earlier declined to define.
29
 The report essentially deferred the task to private 
insurers, who have substantial experience in defining medical necessity, while 
emphasizing the values of “individualizing care, ensuring value, and having medical 
necessity decisions strongly rooted in evidence.”
30
 Thus, the IOM report stated that 
services meeting the requirements of medical necessity will be those that are “(1) 
clinically appropriate for the individual patient, (2) based on the best scientific 
evidence, taking into account the available hierarchy of medical evidence, and (3) 
likely to produce incremental health benefits relative to the next best alternative that 
justify any added cost.”
31
 The report also noted that patients’ rights would be most 
fully protected through the requirement of an “independent external review” that 
“will begin de novo and will be binding on the insurer” in cases where medical 
necessity is disputed.
32
 
Of course, the IOM report’s emphasis on medical benefit, functionality, and 
medical purpose would seem to clearly exclude certain types of procedures—those 
generally denominated as cosmetic, for example. Yet, even this apparently bright 
line admits of some fuzziness. For example, would a procedure such as breast 
reconstruction after surgery for removal of a tumor,
33
 or microtia repair for a child 
born without an outer ear
34
—two procedures that are regularly covered by 
insurance—fall within this definition?
 35
  
2. International Law 
Of course, outside the immediate context of the ACA, there have been other 
attempts to define “health” and “medical necessity.” Efforts to define and delimit an 
international right to health, for example, have necessarily struggled with the 
question of what constitutes a minimum required level of healthcare for all.
36
 Health, 
in the international context, is understood broadly. Thus, descriptive efforts often 
                                                           
29 Id. at 5-26. 
30 Id. at 5-28. 
31 Id. 
32 Id.; see also ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2719(a)-(b), 124 Stat. 119, 887-88 (2010) (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)-(b)) (requiring availability of internal and external review 
processes for coverage determinations). 
33 Health insurance plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
currently must cover post-mastectomy breast reconstruction. 29 U.S.C. § 1185b(a) (2006). 
34 Microtia is a congenital condition, in which children are born with a partial or no external ear 
formation. Microtia repair generally adds no functionality. See June K. Wu, Outer Ear Construction: 
Is Advocacy Part of Treatment?, 12 VIRTUAL MENTOR 367, 369-70 (2010), available at 
http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2010/05/pdf/ccas2-1005.pdf (describing microtia and noting that 
insurance companies sometimes decline to cover one or more stages of microtia repair); Microtia 
Repair, FACIAL COSMETIC SURGERY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, 
http://www.cosmeticuva.com/html/services/microtiaRepair.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (noting that 
repair of the external ear does not improve any hearing loss associated with the original birth defect, 
and stating that insurance generally covers microtia repair). 
35 Cf. ACA § 9017 (defining “cosmetic surgery and medical procedure” as a procedure that is 
“performed by a licensed medical professional” and “not necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising 
from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a persona injury resulting from an accident or 
trauma, or disfiguring disease”) (superseded by id. § 10907(b)). 
36 See, e.g., Virginia Leary, The Right to Health in International Human Rights Law, 1 HEALTH 
& HUM. RTS. 24, 25 (1994); Anika Rahman & Rachael N. Pine, An International Human Right to 
Reproductive Health Care: Toward Definition and Accountability, 1 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 401, 405-
06 (1998) (noting that “[i]nternational organizations and scholars have made several attempts to 
provide content to the right to health” and to describe its minimum “core content”). 
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hearken back to the World Health Organization definition of “health” as “a state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity.”
37
 For example, General Comment 14 to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights defines the “right to health” as 
“embrac[ing] a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in 
which people lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of 
health, such as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water and 
adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a healthy 
environment.”
38
  
Such definitions may be critiqued on many grounds: for starters, they are quite 
vague.
39
 More importantly, perhaps, it is wildly aspirational to suggest that any 
constitutional, statutory, or human rights-based right to health could encompass the 
swath of services that would be required to achieve such a state of health in any 
enforceable way.
40
 Consequently, although a number of constitutions that were 
adopted after the mid-twentieth century, under the influence of human rights law, 
recognize a right to health, the content of that right often remains undefined. For this 
reason, the definitional struggle may shift to determining when a minimum core of 
required health services has been provided, or on whether a government is moving 
sufficiently toward the progressive realization of such a state of health for all 
citizens.
41
 
3. Constitutional Law—Reproductive Rights Cases 
Although American law has not explicitly recognized a positive right to health, 
U.S. courts have had occasion to address the meaning of health and medical 
necessity in other contexts. In particular, significant litigation has surrounded the 
meaning and effect of the requirement, derived from the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Roe v. Wade
42
 and Stenberg v. Carhart,
43
 that abortion regulations must not 
endanger a woman’s health and that even restrictions on post-viability abortions 
                                                           
37 Constitution of the World Health Organization, Preamble, July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 186 
[hereinafter WHO Constitution]. 
38 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard 
of Health: General Comment No. 14, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000); see also Lance 
Gable, Reproductive Health as a Human Right, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 957, 979-81 (2010); Eleanor 
D. Kinney, The International Human Right to Health: What Does This Mean for Our Nation and 
World?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1457, 1467-68 (2001) (describing the “broad and inclusive” right to health 
outlined in General Comment 14). 
39 See, e.g., Rahman & Pine, supra note 36, at 406. 
40 See, e.g., Leary, supra note 36, at 28 (“Superficially, the ‘right to health’ seems to presume 
that government or international organizations or individuals must guarantee a person’s good health. 
This interpretation is obviously absurd and the phrase is not given such an interpretation in the context 
of human rights law.”). 
41 See, e.g., Soobramoney v. Minister of Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (applying the South 
African right to health, but holding it did not require the state to provide dialysis treatment to the 
plaintiff); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 
527-32 (1992) (discussing the difficulties that some countries experience in implementing a right to 
health); cf. 241/2001 Purohit & Moore v. The Gambia, Commc’n No. 241/2001 (Afr. Comm’n on 
Human & Peoples’ Rights 2003) (noting the state’s obligation “to take concrete and targeted steps” to 
realize the right to health “while taking full advantage of its available resources”). 
42 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
43 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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must give way when the woman’s health is at stake.
44
 Thus, it may be useful to 
consider how, if at all, abortion case-law has defined health and medical necessity. 
Unfortunately, those concepts are never very well defined in this line of 
jurisprudence. One issue is whether reproductive healthcare can properly be 
considered an aspect of healthcare in general, or whether it must be treated as a 
unique category. Doe v. Bolton,
45
 the companion case to Roe v. Wade, speaks of 
abortion itself as being, at least in part, a medical decision that should be treated like 
other medical decisions.
46
 Indeed, those opinions have been criticized by feminist 
scholars for the extent to which they treat abortion as a matter of medical judgment, 
to be placed in the hands of the physician, even to the exclusion of the agency and 
judgment of the woman herself.
47
 Thus, the Court in Roe claimed to “vindicate[] the 
right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional 
judgment up to the points where important state interests provide compelling 
justifications for intervention.”
48
 Until the point of viability, when the state’s interest 
in the fetus becomes compelling, the Court explained, “the abortion decision in all 
its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility 
for it must rest with the physician.”
49
 Similarly, the Court in Doe compared the 
abortion procedure to other surgical procedures, noting that the Georgia statute at 
issue in that case regulated abortion in ways that were unimaginable for other 
surgeries.
50
 It further underlined the importance of the physician’s medical judgment 
in determining the appropriateness of abortion in an individual case.
51
  
In addition, the Doe Court addressed the scope of the concept of “health.” It 
considered the advisability of abortion, as medical procedure, to be a calculation that 
takes into account not only the woman’s health concerns, but also her well-being in 
a more holistic sense—including “physical, emotional, psychological, [and] familial 
[factors], [as well as] the woman’s age.”
52
 Doe thus views health as a broad concept, 
touching on not only physical health but also mental, emotional, and social factors. 
This definition of health may even recall the World Health Organization’s definition 
of health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”
53
  
Interestingly, moreover, the decision regarding medical need for the abortion 
procedure appeared to be one that should be made primarily by the doctor, rather 
than by parties external to the doctor-patient relationship. Indeed, this understanding 
of the doctor’s role also seemed to play a role in the legislative debates in the 1970s 
over the reauthorization and scope of the Hyde Amendment, which generally 
prohibits the use of Federal Medicaid funds for abortions, with very limited 
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exceptions.
54
 While some Senators attempted to broaden the subsidy to include not 
only life-saving abortions but also those that were “medically necessary,” supporters 
of the broadening language, citing Doe v. Bolton, noted that the change would thus 
“leave it to the woman and her doctor to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.”
55
  
Although Doe’s broad definition of “health” did not appear to carry much 
influence in subsequent decision-making, the concept of the maternal “health 
exception,” introduced in Roe, became a central point of contention over the 
definition of “medical necessity.” In particular, Roe held that even at the point of 
viability, when the state has a compelling interest in the life of the fetus, the state’s 
interest must give way when the woman’s life or health is at risk. Yet, the Court 
must mean something different by “health” in this context than when it talks about 
abortion as an aspect of healthcare in general. In other words, in the post-viability 
context, protecting “health” apparently refers, in a more narrow way, to something 
like freedom from harm—and probably significant harm. It seems to have an 
affiliation to the concept of self-defense, as it permits the woman, essentially, to 
protect herself when she is threatened by the pregnancy.
56
 It is an open question 
whether mental health threats, as opposed to threats to the woman’s physical health, 
are sufficient to trigger the post-viability abortion exception.
57
 Thus, this constricted 
definition of “health” may be contrasted with the more general concept of 
“healthcare,” or perhaps even interventions having a “medical purpose.” Those 
terms contemplate a more holistic view of health, as a state of overall well-being and 
the object of autonomous decision-making about how to take care of one’s body.  
Gonzales v. Carhart and Stenberg v. Carhart,
58
 the Supreme Court’s two 
“partial-birth abortion” cases, contain the most significant discussions of health as 
medical necessity in the abortion context. In both Stenberg and Gonzales, the 
Supreme Court considered whether laws banning a procedure referred to as “partial-
birth abortion” were unconstitutional because they lacked a health exception that 
would allow the procedure to be performed when it is safer for the woman than other 
available procedures. Gonzales and Stenberg are particularly germane to the concept 
of medical necessity. Precisely stated, the issue before the Court in both cases was 
whether the state can, consistent with the Constitution, force a woman to have a 
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WHAT IS THE MEANING OF HEALTH? 455 
legally permissible abortion by means of a procedure that her doctor believes is 
riskier for her than another available procedure.
59
 The Court held in Stenberg that 
this was in fact unconstitutional. In so doing, it seemed to have recognized, in part, a 
sort of medical self-defense right, involving an understanding of medical necessity, 
in the abortion context, as freedom from state-imposed harm.  
Moreover, the Court arguably clung to the same concept of health in Gonzales v. 
Carhart, even though the case itself came out the other way and upheld a federal 
partial-birth abortion ban that lacked a health exception allowing the procedure to be 
performed when necessary to avoid health risks to the woman.
60
 The opinion took 
issue neither with the notion that women have a right to avoid harm to their health 
resulting from a government-imposed abortion restriction, nor with the notion that 
this particular regulation (a ban on this particular abortion procedure) may in some 
circumstances impose significant health risks on a particular woman.
61
 Rather, the 
Supreme Court turned away the latter challenge, because it felt that, in light of the 
allegedly conflicting medical evidence before it, the existence vel non of those risks 
should be considered in the context of an as-applied challenge rather than the facial 
challenge that the plaintiffs had brought.
62
  
Thus, despite their differences, both Gonzales and Stenberg seemed to view the 
health exception as preventing harm to the woman’s health in the form of significant 
risks; whether that includes only physical risks or possibly also mental health risks is 
unclear. But at the same time, the cases differ in terms of who is entitled to 
determine how best to avoid harm to the woman’s health. The Stenberg Court, 
having determined the possibility of health risks, appeared content to leave it largely 
to the woman and her doctor to decide whether and when the procedure is medically 
necessary and appropriate.
63
 The Gonzales Court, to say the least, was more 
skeptical: it seemed to see some role for the legislature in defining what procedures 
may and may not be medically necessary, and it was unwilling to adopt an across-
the-board health exception that would essentially delegate decisions about medical 
necessity to the individual physician.
64
 Instead, the Gonzales Court saw a need for 
continuing involvement by the government—including, perhaps the courts, which 
would be charged with further specifying when the procedure was or was not 
necessary to protect a woman’s health.
65
 
4. Constitutional Law—Eighth Amendment Cases 
Another area of constitutional law in which medical necessity may be 
implicated is case-law examining prisoners’ rights to adequate medical care under 
the Eighth Amendment.
66
 Prisoners, who are at the mercy of the state for medical 
care, are entitled to a certain level of healthcare provided by the state; the state’s 
failure to provide that level of care may give rise to a claim for a violation of the 
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Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.
67
 The Supreme 
Court has made it clear that the standard under the Eighth Amendment is a 
demanding one, requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate the government’s “deliberate 
indifference” to the prisoner’s “serious medical needs.”
68
 
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this standard to mean something more serious 
than “routine discomfort” must be present; moreover, the failure to provide 
treatment must be likely to “result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain.’”
69
 The Ninth Circuit’s standard encompasses “an 
injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 
comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects 
an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.”
70
 
Similarly, several other circuits define a “serious medical need” as “one that has 
been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that 
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
71
 It 
seems clear that this definition includes mental health needs.
72
 This definition does 
not, of course, describe the level of services that must be provided in response to 
medical need;
73
 it does, however, provide a description—much like that found in 
Gonzales and Stenberg—of when medical necessity exists and the right to medical 
treatment is triggered.
74
  
5. Summary 
This brief survey of judicial and non-judicial attempts to define terms such as 
“health” and “medical necessity” for legal purposes has resulted in a widely 
divergent set of concepts.
75
 On one pole are definitions, such as those found in the 
Eighth Amendment and “partial-birth abortion” contexts, that are narrowly 
concerned with protecting an individual’s physical and perhaps mental well-being 
from severe, state-imposed harms. Those definitions might relate most closely to the 
concept of medical necessity. On the other pole are definitions, such as those in the 
human rights context and in Roe and Doe, that recognize health as a broad concept 
and medicine as a holistic practice, affecting not just physical and mental well-being 
in the strictest sense, but also the individual’s social state. Arguably, this latter 
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definition plays a role in the ACA’s concept of “essential health benefits” as 
including “habilitation,” which has a clear social element. Finally, it is important to 
recall that medical necessity is, on the ground, often defined simply as that which is 
likely to bring more benefit than harm for the patient—or at least enough so to 
justify the cost.
76
 
Of course, it is not entirely surprising that decision-makers reach different 
definitions of the constellation of concepts such as “health,” “medical necessity,” 
and “essential health benefits,” given the wide variety of contexts in which the terms 
are used and the multitude of different purposes for which they are mobilized. It is 
entirely reasonable that medical necessity might be defined more narrowly by a 
court deciding about women’s access to a particular method of later-term abortion, 
but more broadly by a document that sets forth entitlements of a comprehensive 
government benefit program. The protean nature of the term is nonetheless 
noteworthy—and perhaps more importantly, as this Article argues below, it may 
prove to be constitutionally problematic. 
B. THE POLITICS OF “HEALTH” 
Commentators have acknowledged the fraught nature of this definitional 
undertaking. Indeed, the IOM report on essential health benefits itself states that “the 
determination of the EHB [essential health benefits] is a politically and socially 
charged endeavor.”
77
 The concepts of healthcare and medical necessity implicate 
particularly thorny debates when they are invoked in relation to volatile issues such 
as women’s reproductive healthcare. Moreover, because of its ill-defined and 
inherently malleable nature, the concept of medical necessity is often a mask for 
decision-making that is primarily based on non-medical grounds, including moral 
judgments, as well as more mundane concerns about value and cost. 
In a recent book, Professor Gregg Bloche argues that judgments about “medical 
necessity” are often a covert form of healthcare rationing by insurance companies.
78
 
Insurance companies, being naturally unable or unwilling to pay for all of the 
healthcare that may be desired by a consumer or a physician, must make judgments 
about what they will and will not pay for. They thus make decisions about allocation 
of healthcare dollars and resources based on judgments—often reasonable but not 
always transparent—not about the beneficial or non-beneficial nature of the 
treatment at issue, but rather about whether the cost is justified by the additional 
“quality-adjusted life years” saved.
79
 
In some unusual but highly salient cases, political judgments have infected 
medical decision-making in a very direct way. Bloche points to such examples as the 
Bush administration’s attempts to minimize payments for mental health services to 
veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder by influencing the frequency 
with which the condition was diagnosed.
80
 But more generally, he argues, “[a]ll 
medical diagnosis is political,” in that it “defines personal characteristics—signs and 
symptoms—as both undesirable (‘pathological’) and beyond the scope of one’s 
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personal responsibility.”
81
 Labeling something as a medically treatable pathology, 
Bloche explains, “mobilizes social resources (public and private insurance) . . . , and 
it excuses people from myriad social obligations.”
82
 Examples of the political 
content of medical diagnoses abound. One need only think of the appearance and 
disappearance of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders as an identified mental illness, or of the controversy over whether 
deafness should be thought of as a sometimes-treatable disability or as a cultural 
characteristic to be embraced.
83
 Bloche also points to the movements to label obesity 
or short stature as conditions requiring medical intervention.
84
 In the former case, 
labeling obesity as a disease rather than a sign of personal weakness or a lifestyle 
choice involves judgments about culture, personal responsibility, and even free 
will.
85
 Likewise, treating short stature as a medical condition involves making 
certain judgments about the importance of aesthetics, the relevance of social well-
being to “health,” and the role of hardship in building individual moral character.
86
 It 
is, simply put, impossible to judge whether a symptom is unusual or pathological 
without some reference to what is normal, and it is impossible to determine 
normalcy without some reference to social, cultural, and moral values.
87
  
The definition of “health” is also political in the sense that, in an age of rising 
costs and limited funds, it unavoidably involves judgments about the proper or fair 
allocation of scarce resources. Indeed, one commentator has characterized as “[t]he 
doctor’s dilemma” the inevitable tension between defining necessary or appropriate 
care in terms of the “primacy of patient welfare” and ensuring the equitable 
allocation of healthcare resources.
88
 Comparing the American healthcare system to 
those of countries in which healthcare is universal but supported by a limited, 
defined budget, Victor Fuchs argues that the latter is a superior way of ensuring 
physicians act as stewards of those healthcare resources.
89
 “In short,” he asserts, 
“when physicians are collectively caring for a defined population within a fixed 
annual budget, it is easier for the individual physician to resolve the dilemma in 
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favor of cost-effective medicine. That becomes ‘appropriate’ care.”
90
 In other words, 
the necessity of taking cost into account is inherent in the enterprise of medicine, 
and this political dimension of the undertaking cannot be avoided by simply 
delegating the decision-making to a multitude of private actors—namely, patients, 
doctors, and insurance companies. 
Perhaps the most obviously politicized area of healthcare, however, is 
reproductive healthcare. Debates have long raged, and continue to rage, over the 
respective roles of patients, physicians, legislators, regulators, and judges in 
reproductive decision-making, and American society currently lacks consensus over 
the role of reproductive health services within the broader statutory and contractual 
entitlements to healthcare. Indeed, long before the furor erupted over the Obama 
administration’s recent announcement that it would require most private insurers to 
cover prescription contraceptives, courts and commentators debated whether 
contraceptives were part of healthcare and whether insurers’ refusal to cover them 
constituted sex discrimination.
91
 One Washington district court, considering an 
employer’s argument that contraceptives are not healthcare because pregnancy is not 
a disease, asserted that “the availability of affordable and effective contraceptives is 
of great importance to the health of women and children because it can help to 
prevent a litany of physical, emotional, economic, and social consequences.”
92
 Thus 
embracing a broad understanding of health that stretches beyond mere physical well-
being, the court added: “Identifying and obtaining an effective method of 
contraception is a primary healthcare issue throughout much of a woman’s life and 
is, in many instances, of more immediate importance to her daily healthcare situation 
than most other medical needs.”
93
  
Similarly, debates have persisted over whether abortion constitutes a form of 
healthcare, and, if so, what sorts of medical or other factors may be taken into 
account by those making the abortion decision. In particular, there is longstanding 
disagreement over the nature of “therapeutic” abortion, as the political controversy 
over “partial-birth” abortion and the resulting divided Supreme Court opinions 
demonstrate.
94
 Yet, one study of hospital abortion committees, which were charged 
with deciding when therapeutic abortions would be permitted in the decades prior to 
Roe v. Wade, indicates that the politically charged nature of the issue goes back 
much further than the late-1990s.
95
 The debate among physicians over medical 
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indications for abortion was characterized by widespread internal disagreement and 
“reflect[ed] broader cultural attitudes toward women, mothers, babies, and 
pregnancy in the postwar era.”
96
 Indeed, arguably, the permissibility of therapeutic 
abortion to preserve the woman’s life or health turned into a requirement imposed 
upon the doctor “to make sure that the woman stayed moral,” rather than that she 
stayed healthy, by policing the reasons that entitled the woman to an abortion.
97
 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SPECULATION 
Even if the project of defining medical necessity is riddled with uncertainty and 
contestable political judgments, however, it is not automatically entwined with 
constitutional concerns. It may be politically, economically, or ethically problematic 
to define “medical necessity” in a particular way—in general, or in an individual 
case—but that does not make it unconstitutional.  
There are, however, several respects in which a government program regulating 
healthcare might implicate individuals’ constitutional rights. A governmental choice 
to deny certain important healthcare to individuals as medically unnecessary, 
without notice or an opportunity to contest the finding, might constitute a violation 
of procedural due process.
98
 A decision to permit some individuals but not others to 
access a particular form of healthcare could also implicate the Equal Protection 
Clause.
99
 In addition, a decision by the government to criminalize or otherwise take 
certain forms of safe and effective healthcare off the table completely may implicate 
substantive due process rights, or the so-called “negative right to health.” This last 
one is the focus of this Article. 
There are two barriers to recognizing constitutional claims of individuals 
seeking healthcare under the ACA, however. First, it is difficult to locate state action 
in the context of decisions about coverage and medical necessity that will be made 
primarily by private insurers rather than state actors. Second, the Act is in large part 
a governmental spending program—a subsidy, rather than a direct regulation of 
individuals’ healthcare options. Existing precedent clearly establishes that the 
government may choose to subsidize some things and not others, and that the failure 
to subsidize the exercise of a constitutional right is not the same as imposing a 
penalty on the exercise of that right. 
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A. THE NEGATIVE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
Several scholars, including myself, have postulated the existence of a sort of 
“negative right to health.”
100
 In a 2007 article, I suggested that there was a doctrinal 
thread running through the Supreme Court cases dealing with access to reproductive 
healthcare, refusal of medical treatment, and even mandatory vaccination suggesting 
that individuals have a constitutional right to protect their health.
101
 This right, 
moreover, may include a right both to refuse care and to access care—not at 
government expense, but without government interference.
102
 Drawing on the case 
law and scholarship indicating that there is a “freedom of health” that encompasses, 
to some extent, a right to access medical treatment without government interference, 
Professor Abigail Moncrieff has also argued that “[a]s an aspect of general bodily 
autonomy, the freedom to reject care has gained formal recognition in a handful of 
cases, and as a necessary element of reproductive rights, the freedom to obtain 
treatment has been an important, though informal, player in several cases.”
103
  
The requirement of a health exception for prohibitions on post-viability abortion 
is perhaps the most obvious example of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the 
negative right to health. From Roe v. Wade onward, the Supreme Court has made it 
clear that the government may regulate and even prohibit abortions after the fetus is 
viable, but it must make exceptions for abortions that are “necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”
104
 
Professor Eugene Volokh has argued that the right to a post-viability health 
exception represents a right that is separate from the abortion right itself—a right to 
“medical self-defense.”
105
 Although this right has not yet been extended to other 
contexts, “the right can’t logically be limited to situations in which the defensive 
procedure is abortion and rejected,” for example, “when a woman needs to defend 
herself using experimental drugs or an organ transplant.”
106
 
Indeed, several Supreme Court cases recognizing the necessity of a “health 
exception” to abortion regulations seem unexplainable except by reference to such a 
right.
107
 In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
108
 for 
example, the Supreme Court emphasized that states cannot regulate abortion in such 
a way as to impose health risks on the woman, nor can it force a trade-off of the 
woman’s health against the fetus’s.
109
 This is the case, the Court held, even if the 
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fetus is viable—that is, even if the state’s interest in potential life is compelling.
110
 
Indeed, the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart echoed the Thornburgh holding when it 
decided that a state ban on a particular abortion procedure was unconstitutional if the 
permitted procedure was riskier to the woman’s health in a given case.
111
 Indeed, 
Stenberg is a particularly strong example of the negative right to health because it 
involves the question of whether the state can require a particular procedure for an 
abortion that will take place in any case. It is, fundamentally, not a case about the 
circumstances under which the state can act to protect potential life, but rather about 
how the state can regulate surgical procedures in ways that impact a woman’s health 
and bodily integrity. Moreover, although the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart cut back 
in several respects on the scope and enforceability of the right at issue in Stenberg, 
the Gonzales Court nonetheless preserved the essential holding that government 
regulations of abortion methods—and, presumably, a fortiori of any other surgical 
techniques—are unconstitutional if they impose substantial health risks on the 
woman.
112
 
Outside the abortion context, the Supreme Court has recognized a related right 
to refuse medical treatment.
113
 In addition, it implied in Jacobson v. Massachusetts 
that, while the government may impose compulsory vaccination requirements, that 
requirement, too, must be subject to a health exception if it would be harmful to the 
health of a particular individual.
114
 And lower courts have occasionally drawn on 
substantive due process doctrine to find that individuals possess a right to access 
particular forms of healthcare, such as acupuncture
115
 and experimental cancer 
drugs.
116
 At the same time, numerous courts have also denied the existence of a 
constitutional right to access particular medical interventions.
117
 As several 
commentators (including myself) have argued, however, there is a logical and 
doctrinal basis for asserting that substantive due process protects, at least to some 
extent, the right of individuals to access medical care to protect their health.
118
 There 
is, in other words, a negative right to health. 
Of course, “[t]o recognize that individuals possess a constitutional right to 
protect their health by making autonomous medical treatment decisions is not, by 
any means, to decide that the right is a trump card and that states are powerless to 
withhold drugs from the market, regulate the practice of medicine, or prosecute 
quacks;” it is simply to say that a fundamental right is implicated by regulations 
affecting individual healthcare choices and that such regulations must be subject to 
heightened scrutiny.
119
 Moreover, although there is a firm basis for suggesting that a 
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negative right to health has been recognized within abortion jurisprudence, and that 
that right logically extends to other contexts, there is no clear basis for delineating 
the scope of that right. The negative right to health, which has not even been 
recognized as such by the Supreme Court, has no clear contours. It is therefore 
difficult to say what sort of state-imposed harm or what degree of state-imposed 
harm is likely to violate that right. “Health,” in this context too, lacks a clear 
definition. 
To summarize, there is arguably a negative right to health that has been 
recognized in American constitutional jurisprudence—though perhaps not 
consistently or explicitly so—that subjects government action to heightened scrutiny 
when it takes certain healthcare options off the table. Such constitutionally 
problematic regulations may include not only those that force individuals into 
unwanted medical treatment but also those that interfere with individuals’ access to 
safe and appropriate medical treatment. Those precedents do not, however, suggest 
that the government is constitutionally required to subsidize individuals’ medical 
care. Nor have they drawn a clear line as to what sorts of health risks are 
problematic.
120
 In other words, they have not, as illustrated in Part II, given a clear 
interpretation of the meaning of “health” or “medical necessity” for a particular 
treatment.  
B. PENALTIES, SUBSIDIES, AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
The ACA, of course, famously requires individuals to carry health insurance.
121
 
It also imposes certain mandates on private employers and insurance companies that 
almost indisputably benefit individual consumers. Further, the Act expands 
Medicaid eligibility, thus increasing the number of Americans whose healthcare will 
be provided by the government.
122
 It does not, however, directly regulate 
individuals’ healthcare options. Most individuals will continue to carry private 
insurance provided by their employers, or purchased on the open market or through 
state-sponsored insurance exchanges.
123
 Given that the government is not directly 
involved in the contractual relationship between individuals and their private 
insurers or physicians, and therefore that state action is lacking, it may, at first 
glance, be difficult to see how constitutional claims could arise for those individuals. 
The government’s regulation does not prevent anyone from accessing the healthcare 
that they may need or desire if they can pay for it with their own funds, nor does it 
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prevent insurance companies from offering benefits above and beyond the minimum 
essential health benefits, for those consumers who wish to purchase additional 
coverage. 
Even for those individuals who carry Medicaid, constitutional arguments are 
difficult to come by. As the Supreme Court held decades ago—in cases involving 
access to abortion, a form of healthcare—there is a difference between a failure to 
subsidize a constitutional right, which does not constitute a violation of that right, 
and a penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right, which may constitute a 
violation. As the Court held in Maher v. Roe
124
 and Harris v. McRae,
125
 when the 
government chooses to subsidize childbirth but not abortion—even “medically 
necessary” abortions—with Medicaid funds, neither the woman’s right to equal 
protection nor her substantive due process right to choose abortion is violated.
126
  
The woman’s right to choose abortion, and possibly her negative right to health, 
would be implicated if the government had instituted a total prohibition on 
therapeutic abortion, rather than a simple funding ban. Thus, as the Court explained 
in Maher, “[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a 
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with 
legislative policy.
 
Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to 
impose its will by force of law; the State’s power to encourage actions deemed to be 
in the public interest is necessarily far broader.”
127
 Analogizing to another 
constitutional right—the right to direct the education of one’s children—the Court 
explained that it had never held that the Constitution “established a ‘right of private 
or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse,’” and observed 
that “[i]t is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private 
schools and quite another to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal 
protection, receive state aid.”
128
 Thus, even assuming—as argued above—that direct 
regulation of individuals’ healthcare choices may implicate constitutional 
substantive due process, the failure to subsidize certain healthcare choices through a 
federal spending program generally does not rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation.
129
 
For those Americans whose insurance will be regulated by the ACA but not 
directly provided by the government, it appears equally difficult to argue that 
constitutional rights may be implicated by the government’s decision-making 
regarding essential health benefits and medical necessity, for at least three reasons. 
First, the ACA’s decisions regarding medical necessity and essential health benefits 
impose mandates on insurers, not on individuals. The individual mandate aside, the 
ACA does very little to direct or constrain individual citizens’ healthcare choices. 
Second, the ACA acts primarily to impose mandates—in the form of minimum 
requirements—on insurers. These mandates, unlike restrictions on care, tend to 
benefit consumers by requiring that they have access to a certain level of healthcare 
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services, while leaving insurers free to cover a broader range of services if they 
wish. Finally, and relatedly, the ACA does not purport to dictate which forms of 
healthcare individuals may purchase with their own funds. There is little evidence, 
therefore, of the sort of governmental coercion or entanglement in individual 
healthcare decisions that would be required to invoke constitutional protections. 
Professor Abigail Moncrieff has nonetheless offered an innovative analysis that 
suggests one way in which constitutional questions may well arise. In her article, 
The Freedom of Health, she raises the question of whether the ACA’s individual 
mandate might violate the negative right to health found guaranteed by the right to 
substantive due process.
130
 Although this Article does not focus specifically on the 
individual mandate, Moncrieff’s analysis and conclusion are relevant to the 
argument presented in this Article.  
Considering the implications of the individual mandate for the freedom of health 
(or in my terminology, the negative right to health), Moncrieff astutely observes: 
[Insurance] contracts give insurers . . . discretion under “medical 
necessity” review to decide whether their insured can buy various 
kinds of health care with the pool’s money. That is, insurance 
companies today use their contracts to steer individuals towards certain 
health care consumption decisions, often refusing to cover treatments 
that they deem ineffective, unnecessary, or even just inordinately 
costly. . . . If she is required to buy into such a contract, a patient will 
give up some degree of freedom and autonomy to choose her own care; 
at a minimum, she will lose some freedom to direct the care that she 
purchases with the dollars that she has set aside in insurance.
131
 
Thus, Professor Moncrieff concludes, the requirement of submitting oneself to this 
sort of medical necessity review—and the reality that most individuals will not be 
able to access healthcare if their insurance will not pay for it—means that the 
government is, at the very least, burdening consumers’ rights to choose the care they 
deem appropriate or necessary to protect their own health.
132
 This could (but 
according to Professor Moncrieff, is not likely to) rise to the level of a violation of 
the constitutional freedom of health.
133
 
Though my analysis diverges from Professor Moncrieff’s somewhat, I agree 
with her approach in finding the potential for state action through the ACA’s 
subjection of individual healthcare choices to government-sponsored medical 
necessity review. Indeed, the point can be made even more strongly: though 
conducted by individual insurers, the medical necessity review under the ACA is 
required by and governed by the federal law. The ACA incorporates, in a sense, the 
private insurers’ decision-making and thereby arguably requires those decisions to 
conform to constitutional norms and requirements. 
Still, several critiques may apply to this line of analysis. First, even recognizing 
that the medical necessity decision-making by private insurers is guided by and 
required by the ACA, it is not entirely clear that this level of governmental 
involvement is sufficient to constitute state action for constitutional purposes. 
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Indeed, the state action inquiry is notoriously amorphous.
134
 Thus, the Supreme 
Court has held that simply operating pursuant to a state license and in compliance 
with a state regulatory scheme does not constitute state action.
135
 Instead, for a 
private individual or entity to become a state actor, his conduct must be entwined 
with the state or his business in symbiotic relation with the state.
136
 The mere fact of 
government regulation—even admittedly extensive government regulation—of 
private insurers most likely does not transform those insurers into state actors, 
according to current state action doctrine. 
Moreover, even in the absence of the ACA’s individual mandate requirement, 
individuals’ healthcare choices are subject to their ability to pay or to locate private 
insurance. There is no indication, as of yet, that the ACA imposes on private insurers 
any stricter “medical necessity” limitations than they already impose on their own 
consumers—and indeed, so far the Obama Administration has demonstrated an 
intent to maintain the status quo by embracing the existing system of private 
decision-making. It is difficult to see how replication of the status quo can suddenly 
constitute a burden on a fundamental right.  
Additionally, individuals remain free to purchase healthcare with their own 
money. The ACA’s mandates thus do not restrict individuals’ healthcare choices, 
just as the Hyde Amendment’s prohibition on using Medicaid funds for abortions 
theoretically leaves Medicaid recipients free to access the procedure on their own.
137
 
It is true that individuals generally cannot access medical care that their insurance 
chooses not to cover, and therefore that their negative constitutional right to access 
care may be, in practical terms, nonexistent. But again, this is true whether or not the 
government requires individuals to carry insurance. As the Court emphasized in 
Maher, the Constitution is not implicated when the individual’s own indigence, 
rather than government-imposed obstacles, prevent her from accessing care.
138
 
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF THE NEGATIVE RIGHT TO 
HEALTH UNDER THE ACA 
This Article proposes a way in which constitutional requirements may still come 
to play a role in the future under the ACA. Over the long term, the new role assumed 
by the federal government in healthcare will likely have two specific effects. First, 
there will eventually be a massive expansion of the number of individuals who are 
covered by government healthcare plans.
139
 Second, there will be an increased 
regulatory role for the federal government in private insurance plans, as the state-
sponsored exchanges take on greater and greater significance vis-à-vis healthcare 
coverage that is obtained in other ways, such as through private employers.
140
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Though not certain to occur, there is reason to believe that both outcomes are likely, 
and possibly intended, long-term effects of the healthcare reform. 
As the government’s role as both provider and regulator of healthcare becomes 
more important and extensive, there will be less room for private insurers to make 
their own decisions about coverage and medical necessity. Even in the absence of 
direct federal mandates pertaining to coverage, private insurers will most likely 
come to offer, almost exclusively, plans that meet the requirements of the 
exchanges, and it would not be surprising if determinations about medical necessity, 
made under standards set forth by the government and subject to external review, 
become somewhat uniform on a national level. Indeed, many would see such a result 
as desirable.
141
 The government’s definition of essential health benefits may thus 
become both a floor and a ceiling.
142
 Indeed, as some health policy analysts have 
argued in a similar context, “if certain types of products are excluded in certain large 
markets,”—such as Medicaid or even simply the exchange-approved plans, which 
may exclude certain benefits because they are not required to offer them—“over 
time the market as a whole for a product can be expected to shift, as manufacturers 
move to accommodate their product to reflect the regulated design.”
143
 It may, for 
example, be more efficient for insurers to design all insurance plans so that they 
meet the minimum requirements—and only the minimum requirements—of a 
particular state’s definition of essential health benefits. In addition, since essential 
health benefits are defined in part by what certain large, “benchmark” plans choose 
to cover,
144
 insurers may well end up dictating the content of those essential benefits 
across states.  
It may be reasonable to believe that at some point, the government’s role in the 
healthcare marketplace will become so significant that the government cannot be 
treated as one actor among many private actors, free to subsidize or deny subsidies 
to various activities as it chooses. Instead, the government’s role as healthcare 
provider and regulator may be analogized to that of a government speaker who so 
dominates the marketplace with its own message that it crowds out almost all private 
speech. At such a point, many commentators agree, constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of speech would be implicated by the actions of the government speaker.
145
 
So, too, might the negative right to health become implicated if the government so 
dominates the healthcare market that private decision-making about medical 
necessity becomes essentially impossible. In other words, at such a point in time, 
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one might wonder whether the distinction between government subsidy and 
government burden remains tenable and meaningful. 
Thus, as Mark Yudof has suggested in the government speech context, although 
the government may have particular interests in speaking in various contexts, a 
functional First Amendment analysis would have to consider the possibility that 
government will distort the marketplace of ideas (and hence individuals’ thinking 
about an issue), as well as “the degree to which the government has captured the 
audience,” among other factors.
146
 In the healthcare context, advocates might one 
day argue that the government has imposed a distorted set of healthcare options on 
an essentially captive audience.  
Indeed, a similar issue arose in Canada, in the case of Chaoulli v. Québec.
147
 In 
Chaoulli, the plaintiff challenged a Québec law prohibiting private insurance and 
requiring individuals to carry only public insurance. The law meant that individuals 
were forbidden to pay out-of-pocket for health care they desired. In a 4-3 decision, 
the Canadian Supreme Court held that this legislation was unconstitutional. Though 
there was no majority rationale, the two majority opinions saw the regulation as 
impermissibly interfering with individuals’ right to seek healthcare to protect 
themselves from bodily harm.
148
 Though such a scenario—a prohibition on all 
private insurance—is certainly not contemplated by the ACA,
149
 the extensive 
degree of government involvement in providing and regulating health insurance that 
may eventually occur due to the ACA could have greatly similar effects. 
Finally, this theory is connected to the problem of defining health and medical 
necessity—and in particular, for defining those terms for constitutional purposes. As 
noted above, although the Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the meaning 
of “health” and “medical necessity” in the abortion context, in cases that appear to 
implicate the negative right to health to a greater or lesser degree, it has not arrived 
at a settled definition. It has drawn on broader and narrower definitions, suggesting 
sometimes that the right to make medical treatment decisions broadly includes the 
right of patients to decide autonomously and in consultation with their physicians on 
appropriate treatment, and at other times intimating that the only right at issue is a 
narrow one to avoid significant state-imposed health risks or serious state-imposed 
physical harm.
150
 To date, the Supreme Court has not decided a substantive due 
process case relying on an explicit and general negative right to health. Its strongest 
and most detailed discussions of the issue appear in the abortion jurisprudence. As 
the ACA expands the role of the government in providing and regulating 
individuals’ healthcare, however, and as the negative right to health may come to 
take on more prominence for a wider swath of Americans, the definition of health 
will take on more significance.  
Though many medical interventions may remain uncontroversial, some will 
certainly raise political concerns, and some decision-making might implicate the 
right to protect one’s health. For example, a decision not to cover bariatric surgery 
for obese individuals may implicate the right to health. Such a claim obviously 
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depends on viewing obesity as a disease rather than a lifestyle choice, and on 
showing that bariatric surgery is “medically necessary.” It immediately becomes 
clear, therefore, that the definitions of “health” and “illness,” as well as “medical 
necessity,” with all their cultural and political dimensions, will be implicated in such 
a claim. Similarly, coverage for arguably cosmetic procedures such as microtia 
repair may become another flashpoint. 
While it appears that the ACA will not extend coverage requirements to 
therapeutic abortion, in any form, any time soon,
151
 the theory set out in this Article 
may well give reproductive rights advocates new ammunition for attacking this sort 
of line-drawing. If the ACA’s regulatory impact is so extensive that it essentially 
terminates the market for private insurance for medically necessary abortions, 
plaintiffs may well have an argument that this new burden is more substantial and 
more constitutionally significant than the burden of Medicaid non-subsidy, which 
the Supreme Court dismissed in Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae.
152
  
Other issues may arise in the reproductive health context as well. For example, 
it is conceivable that states could outlaw coverage for prenatal genetic testing or 
counseling, on the theory that it is likely to lead to abortion.
153
 Another imaginable 
scenario is that insurance companies will decline to provide coverage for vaginal 
birth after a first child is born through caesarean section.
154
 If governmental 
regulations end up making these safe and legal medical services unavailable for all 
intents and purposes, courts may one day decide that women’s rights to procreative 
autonomy and bodily integrity are implicated. 
Finally, medical marijuana may also become the subject of negative right to 
health claims. Several states have legalized its use, when sanctioned by a doctor’s 
diagnosis and supervision.
155
 Though cannabis is not currently approved by the 
FDA, and therefore is not generally covered by insurers, it is plausible to suggest 
that constitutional issues might be raised, eventually, if the federal regulations either 
forbid coverage for cannabis, or result in private insurers’ refusal to cover it.
156
  
                                                           
151 The ACA explicitly excludes abortion from the definition of “essential health benefits.” ACA, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1303(b), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)). In 
addition, states may prohibit insurance companies that offer plans on state-sponsored exchanges from 
covering abortion. Id. § 1303(a). 
152 The ACA contains a provision allowing states to prohibit the sale of insurance for abortions 
on state-sponsored exchanges and excluding abortion from the definition of essential health benefits. 
Id. § 1303(a), 1303(b)(1)(A). In addition, it imposes extremely stringent requirements regarding the 
segregation of funds by any qualified health plan seeking to offer insurance for abortions other than 
those for which federal funding is permitted under the Hyde Amendment (such as lifesaving 
abortions). Id. § 1303(b). 
153 See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and 
Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 377 (2011). 
154 See generally Jamie R. Abrams, From “Barbarity” to Regularity: A Case Study of 
“Unnecesarean” Malpractice Claims, 63 S.C. L. REV. 191, 227-34 (2011). 
155 Sixteen states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana. Medical 
Marijuana, PROCON.ORG, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012). 
156 But cf. United States v. Cannabis Cultivator’s Club, No. C 98-0085 CRB, 1999 WL 111893, at 
*2-3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1999) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims of a substantive due process right to 
access medical marijuana). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has not aimed to define the term “health,” of course, but simply to 
sketch out some of the important constitutional questions that may turn on such a 
definition. The nature and extent of individuals’ right to protect their health under 
the Constitution may pertain to a wide variety of healthcare choices and, 
particularly, whether individuals have a right to a wide range of healthcare options, 
or only to resist governmental decisions that take the safest and most efficient 
options off the table. It will impact whether social and cultural factors may be taken 
into account, or only narrowly defined “medical” ones.  
At a minimum, the possibility of a new constitutional claim for violation of the 
negative right to health may have one positive effect. The existence of such a claim 
may force the debate about the meaning of “health” out of the shadows and into a 
more deliberative forum. That forum would of course be the courts, which may or 
may not, however, be the ideal place for it.
157
 Indeed, though little is certain about 
where the debate will end up, it seems clear that the government will not be able to 
avoid the issue forever. 
                                                           
157 One might argue, for example, that legislatures are more competent than judges at making 
sensitive, fact-intensive decisions such as those that may be required in the context of healthcare 
policy and allocation of healthcare resources. At the same time, there is an argument to be made that 
judges are better suited to make decisions about individual healthcare entitlements. I discuss this issue 
at greater length in Hill, Tale of Two Doctrines, supra note 100, at 332-41. 
